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Abstract  
This article first discusses the contemporary debate on cultural 
‘creativity’ and the economy. Second, it considers the current state of UK 
copyright law and how it relates to cultural work. Third, based on 
empirical research on British dancers and musicians, an analysis of 
precarious cultural work is presented. A major focus is how those who 
follow their art by way of ‘portfolio’ work handle their rights in ways that 
diverge significantly from the current simplistic assumptions of law and 
cultural policy. Our conclusions underline the distance between present 
top-down conceptions of what drives production in the cultural field and 
the actual practice of dancers and musicians. 
Keywords: creative economy; creative industries; contracts; copyright; 
cultural policy; cultural work; dance; intellectual property; music; 
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A personal preamble 
It is a particular pleasure to participate in this 25th anniversary number of 
Innovation. Philip Schlesinger, lead author of this article, contributed to 
the very first number of the journal when it was still being published in 
German and had a somewhat experimental look and feel (Schlesinger 
1988). Since then, he has maintained a long-standing connection with 
ICCR. He was present at its board meetings and seminars in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and, as a founding member of the International 
Advisory Board, has also advised Innovation. ICCR’s interdisciplinary 
approach, its tenacious engagement with both theory and policy, and its 
empirical vocation are admirable in his view, because this stance has 
created an important space in European social science research that is 
heterodox and which provides a crossing-point for academics and a range 
of policy communities to engage in exchanges. For a relatively small, 
independently financed body, ICCR has been the impresario of 
impressive conferences, a sustained European research agenda and - to 
the evident appreciation of its readership - has kept a high-quality journal, 
Innovation, going for a quarter of century. This is no small feat. 
Onwards! 
 
Introduction 
This article is the product of interdisciplinary collaboration between a 
cultural sociologist and an intellectual property lawyer.1 Our research, 
which has been exploratory in scope, has aimed to investigate the 
relationships between copyright law and cultural workers in the fields of 
music and dance.  
 
In pursuit of our interest in how experimental and experiential works (and 
therefore the musicians and dancers who produced them) were handled 
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by copyright law, we carried out a series of in-depth interviews with UK-
based dancers and musicians in the course of 2009-11. Almost all our 
interviewees were involved in ‘portfolio’ work, namely the combination 
of various forms of paid labour to enable them to pursue their art. The 
key point for the purposes of this investigation is that they could not 
make a complete living from music and dance.2  
 
Most of our interviews with musicians and dancers were video-recorded 
and those that were not were audio-recorded. We also video-recorded 
some performances. Some of these interviews and performances have 
been incorporated into a short video documentary (Schlesinger and 
Waelde 2011), whereas the legal dimensions of the work were published 
in an academic journal article (Waelde and Schlesinger 2011). Third-
party interviews with the authors and also some participants in the study 
are in the public domain, as is the fieldwork archive on which the 
empirical parts of this article are based (AHRC 2011).3 The reader may 
therefore readily explore our work beyond the confines of what is 
presented here. 
 
A principal aim of this study has been to engage with two major bodies of 
thought and practice and to question some of their underlying 
assumptions. These are first, ‘creative industries’ policy (which plays 
across the domains of British cultural, communications and economic 
policy) and copyright law. In the UK, copyright law – while, of course, 
retaining its autonomy as a distinct field of legal practice - has become 
closely connected discursively to government strategies for exploiting the 
activities of those working in what are increasingly indiscriminately 
labelled the ‘creative economy’ and the ‘digital economy’.  
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This is strikingly evident in the two most recent British inquiries into the 
reform of intellectual property law, those headed by Andrew Gowers and 
Ian Hargreaves. 
 
According to Gowers (2006: 1), ‘In the modern world, knowledge capital, 
more than physical capital, drives the UK economy…The ideal IP system 
creates incentives for innovation, without unduly limiting access for 
consumers and follow-on innovators.’ Creative industries are identified as 
a key sector of the ‘knowledge based industries’ and creative expressions 
are seen as value creating, as subject to IP rights and as needing 
protection from counterfeit goods and piracy (Gowers 2006: 3). 
 
A mere five years later, Hargreaves (2011: 3) started from the similar 
proposition that IP policy ‘is an increasingly important tool for 
stimulating economic growth’ within a highly competitive global 
economy. If anything, the creative economy was even more central to this 
further review’s thinking: 
 
‘In copyright, the interests of the UK’s creative industries are of great 
national importance. Digital creative industry exports rank third, behind 
only advanced engineering and financial and professional services. In 
order to grow these creative businesses further globally, they need 
efficient, open and effective digital markets at home, where rights can be 
speedily licensed and effectively protected.’ (2011: 3) 
 
The assumption is that the rights regime per se will be of central interest 
to creators and condition how they work. However, Ruth Towse (2006: 
581), in critiquing current orthodoxy in the field of cultural economics, 
has rightly questioned this supposition: 
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‘If we are to believe that copyright, or more precisely authors’ and 
performers’ rights, are fundamental to cultural production, we need far 
more evidence than at present exists to demonstrate the case. Moreover, it 
may be that artistic motivation and the incentive to produce works of art 
are not just due to financial rewards and economic rights but also to 
moral rights.’ 
 
Our own highly convergent argument is rooted in cultural sociology and 
copyright law rather than cultural economics. In what follows, first, we 
set out some relevant elements of the contemporary debate on creativity 
and the economy; second, we consider the current state of copyright law 
and how it bears on the issues discussed; third, we present some of our 
empirical findings with particular reference to the question of precarious 
cultural work and discuss these in the light of the foregoing; and finally, 
we draw our conclusions. 
 
The ‘creative economy’ 
Ever since the late 1990s, policy makers, academic analysts and 
consultants have identified the ‘creative industries’ as a key driving force 
in the national economy. The dominant line of argument has tended 
towards rather uncritical support of the economic exploitation of culture 
in the pursuit of competition in global trade – witness the Gowers and 
Hargreaves reports. A variety of forms of state or other public 
intervention have been proposed to that end, with government ministers 
worldwide talking up the capabilities and talents of their own ‘creative 
nation’. Measures taken have included investing in ‘human capital’, 
creating special agencies to support cultural producers in developing their 
business and technological skills, using fiscal measures to promote given 
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industries, and embarking on culture-led urban regeneration. Although 
critiques of the effectiveness of such specific measures have been 
articulated, the credibility of evidence about the importance of the 
‘creative economy’ has been questioned and indeed, economistic 
conceptions of culture have been denounced tout court, the counter-blasts 
have yet not displaced a framework of thought that has now achieved the 
status of global orthodoxy.4  
 
However, while the impressive edifice of creative economy thinking 
claims to offer a panoramic vista from the ramparts of the castle onto the 
cultural fields below, its viewpoint is a rather partial one. The prime 
concern is with monetary success. As we shall argue on the basis of our 
findings, in fact both policy and law have relatively little engagement 
with most cultural work and what makes it tick. 
 
Public policy arguments about the supposedly transformative significance 
of the creative industries were first most fully developed in the UK, 
notably under the New Labour government elected in 1997 and led by 
Prime Minister Tony Blair. The ideas that then came into play were the 
outcome of several lines of filiation with an extensive hinterland both in 
social science and in earlier public policy interventions.5  
 
As culture is centrally concerned with symbols and meaning it is also 
necessarily profoundly linked to projects of collective identity. For 
example, debates initiated in the early eighties by UNESCO (1982), 
which focused on the rights of cultures to cultural identities, gave an 
underlying rationale to conceptions of cultural defence that have also 
long played into the cultural industries debate. It was but a short step 
from thinking of culture as a defensible space to – more offensively - 
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regarding cultural industries as instruments for the articulation and 
dissemination of a given culture in a global marketplace of competing 
projects. For instance, the short-lived attempt to secure a ‘Latin 
audiovisual space’ as a counterpoint to ‘Anglo-Saxon’ dominance of 
global cultural flows was an early example of this approach (Mattelart et 
al. 1983). Over the past three decades, arguments have shifted from the 
critique of cultural imperialism to the analysis of the globalization of 
culture. Moves to ‘internationalise’ our analytical apparatus so as to 
escape Ulrich Beck’s (2003) bête noire of ‘methodological nationalism’, 
cannot in the end avoid the continuing pertinence of nations and states to 
our thinking about the cultural industries and their dual role – that of 
expressing collective identity and producing wealth (Morris and 
Waisbord 2001; Thussu 2009). 
 
In the UK, cultural industries policies were first developed at a local 
level, notably by Labour Party-run councils in pursuit of urban 
regeneration to counter the de-industrialisation accelerated by the 
Conservative government policies of Margaret Thatcher (Garnham 1990; 
Hesmondhalgh 2007). It was around this time that many of the tropes so 
familiar today developed. The ‘city of culture’ – Glasgow being a signal, 
early example of a ‘European City of Culture’ - became a prime locus for 
‘clusters’ of ‘cultural enterprises’ (Florida 2002; McGuigan 2010). This 
rather leaden terminological repertoire has become thoroughly 
normalized, not least through the consistent effort undertaken by New 
Labour under Prime Minister Tony Blair to develop a political language 
that embodied a particular worldview. The socio-linguist, Norman 
Fairclough (2000: 22-23), has shown how ‘assumptions about the global 
economy’ led ‘to an emphasis on competition between Britain and other 
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countries…a project of “national renewal” designed to improve Britain’s 
competitive position’.  
 
In this connection, it is doubtless rare for a conceptually and empirically 
flimsy government report to achieve widespread influence in 
international academic and policy circles. But that is precisely what 
occurred with the publication of the UK Government’s Creative 
Industries Mapping Document. In a formulation that has now lasted a 
decade and a half, creative industries were defined by the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) as ‘those activities which have their 
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential 
for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of 
intellectual property’. The seminal text continued: 
 
‘These have been taken to include the following key sectors: advertising, 
architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, 
film, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, 
software and television and radio.’(DCMS 1998: 3) 
 
The core purpose of the Task Force was ‘to recommend steps to 
maximize the economic impact of the UK creative industries at home and 
abroad’ (DCMS 1998: 3). Three points are relevant. First, the list of 
thirteen industries identified is arbitrary: we may readily find different 
lists proposed by others, as well as a gamut of conceptual refinements 
relating, for instance, to which are to be judged core or peripheral 
industries (e.g. UNCTAD 2008; The Work Foundation 2007). Second, 
the DCMS made as clear a statement of cultural economic nationalism as 
one could wish for and this accounts in no small measure for its 
widespread appeal around the globe. Third, the centrality of intellectual 
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property to the exploitation of economic gains produced by the creative 
industries is unmistakable. 
 
Creative industries discourse has been decidedly marked by a neologistic 
style. The successor idea of the ‘creative economy’, a trope that has 
gained increasing contemporary currency in the past decade, also affords 
a pivotal position to intellectual property. It has been characteristic in this 
field for a small bevy of writers close to the policy action to be 
popularisers of official discourse while also acting as purveyors of 
marketable expertise.6 In the game of advising governments, the luckiest 
coiners of appealing buzzwords may come to whisper influentially in the 
Prince’s ears. John Howkins, a consultant well connected in policy, 
communications and academic research circles, was one of the first to 
write about the creative economy, like others selecting his own favoured 
list of what counted as a relevant sector.7 Part and parcel of the prevailing 
orthodoxy and well informed by his global encounters, his analysis lays 
unsurprising emphasis on intellectual property and its key role in ‘the 
global battle for comparative advantage’ (Howkins 2001:  79). For him, 
as for others, the prime case for taking creativity seriously is that it has an 
economic dimension and that it should therefore be regarded as ‘a 
substantial component of human capital’ (Howkins 2001: 211).  
 
There is ample evidence that these largely instrumental views have been 
widely propagated. In the European Union, for instance, while not all 
member states have taken up the creative economy cause with equal 
enthusiasm, during the past few years the European Commission (2010) 
has by degrees been won over, putting the creative and cultural industries 
at the heart of the European Agenda for Culture in the framework of the 
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European Union’s Lisbon strategy for jobs and growth, originally set out 
in March 2000.  
 
A clear indication of de facto globalization of the creativity agenda may 
be found in the UN’s Creative Economy Report 2008 which has gone so 
far as to style the creative economy ‘a new development paradigm’ and 
linked it to sustainable development (UNCTAD 2008: 3). The offensive-
defensive duality of the underlying stance on the question of cultural 
value – traceable at the very least to the positions adopted by UNESCO in 
the 1980s - is also manifestly present when it is maintained that ‘support 
for creative domestic industries should be seen as an integral part of the 
promotion and protection of cultural diversity’ (UNCTAD 2008: 5). 
According to The Creative Economy Report 2008, take-up of the 
creativity agenda is uneven around the globe but, nonetheless, significant. 
Much attention is also given to intellectual property rights, in keeping 
with the focus of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) – 
like UNESCO and UNCTAD, a UN agency. The emphasis is on what are 
called the ‘core’ copyright industries, namely those ‘that produce and 
distribute works that are protectable under copyright or related rights’, 
which – pertinently for the present study – include music and 
performance (UNCTAD 2008: 143).  
 
Copyright  
As we have set out the detailed legal state of play elsewhere (Waelde and 
Schlesinger 2011), for present purposes, we wish to offer a brief 
overview of the main legal provisions that relate to copyright in the UK 
and to discuss their relevance for the experiential and experimental forms 
of music and dance that we have studied. 
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According to the dominant thinking of creative economy policy, 
copyright is of central importance for cultural work, not least because the 
protections it provides offer an economic incentive to the producer to 
produce.  
 
Music and dance are recognized in the Copyright Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 (CDPA), the current UK legislation regulating copyright.  To be 
protected by copyright, the work must first fall into one of the 
legislation’s definitional categories. Second, there must be the right 
creative effort or originality present in the work, and third, the work must 
be fixed in some material form. What then follows is a legal 
determination of authorship, with the attendant benefits of ownership. 
 
A key requirement for copyright to subsist in a musical or dramatic work 
is that it be fixed in some material form. The work can exist prior to 
fixation but copyright only arises on fixation. What form fixation takes is 
left open in the current legislation and needs only to be ‘in writing or 
otherwise’ (CDPA 1988 s 3[2]). Fixation for music could be in the form 
of the score, whereas for dance one of the widely used notation systems 
such as Laban or Benesh might be deployed. Equally copyright will arise 
if music and dance are recorded in digital form. If such records are to be 
preserved – and perhaps find a market – then resources will be required. 
In effect, although digital technologies and the internet have enabled 
cheap production and distribution, it remains the case that most 
contemporary output in music and dance is available only to the relatively 
small audience that experiences the performance at first hand. 
 
In the UK, in common with many other countries, copyright lasts for 70 
years after the death of the author (CDPA 1988 s 12). Protection is given 
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against the copying of the whole or a substantial part of a work (CPDA 
s16). Music, and especially the recording industry, has been in the front 
line of legal copyright disputes in recent years, given the challenge 
represented by the downloading of music files on the internet and 
disputes between musicians over authorship. By contrast, dance has 
occasioned virtually no case law or wider attention.  
 
While case law has for some time tended not to recognize the 
performative elements of a musical work as worthy of copyright 
protection, later cases have begun to do so. In Fisher v Brooker 2006, for 
instance, the question was whether Fisher was a joint author for copyright 
purposes of organ elements in the 1967 work, ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’, 
by the British progressive rock band, Procol Harum. The judgment was 
that if  
 
‘The contribution of the individual band member to the overall work is 
both significant (in the sense that it is more than merely trivial) and 
original (in the sense that it is the product of skill and labour in its 
creation) and the resulting work is recorded (whether in writing or 
otherwise), that band member is entitled to copyright in the work as one 
of its joint authors and to any composing royalties that follow.’ (Fisher v 
Brooker 2006 par. 46) 
 
This approach to music by the courts seems suited to recognizing the 
collaborative, performative nature of contemporary music making and the 
collective labour, skill and effort used in the realization of a work, and 
relatedly, to acknowledging the way the participants organize their own 
affairs. The relevance of this to our empirical findings will be 
demonstrated below. 
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In the case of dance, however, there is no case law on authorship in the 
UK. The legislation simply states that the author is the person who 
created the work (CPDA 1988 s 9[1]). For dance, it is widely considered 
that the choreographer is the author and therefore the owner of the 
copyright. It is rare for the choreographer to think of the dancer as a co-
creator of the work. 
 
Copyright protects experiential, experimental forms of music and dance 
once these are fixed, although there is much about performance that 
resists fixation. But are the protections that are actually offered in law, 
particularly the legal notions of authorship and the attendant right to 
exclusive exploitation, invoked as a matter of course by most musicians 
and dancers?  
 
Cultural work 
Cultural work is a topic of growing theoretical and empirical interest 
(Oakley 2009). Attention has been given to the often-difficult conditions 
of employment and the subjective toll that these impose on cultural 
workers. Much recent debate has focused on the question of ‘precarity’ 
(from the Italian precarietà, which actually translates as precariousness). 
This concerns an increasingly general condition of insecurity for workers 
in contemporary capitalism, where the welfare or social state is in crisis 
and undergoing continual retrenchment. Precarity carries a strong 
political charge, coupling a sense of exploitative conditions and the 
potential basis for an escape from these through the creation of new 
political subjects (Gill and Pratt, 2008). This line of thought has further 
crystallised in the neologism of the ‘precariat’ – a fusion of precarity and 
proletariat – to designate the economically exploited deemed by some to 
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have the potential to become a new class capable of acting for itself. This 
broad argument has gained followers following the profound and still-
unresolved financial crisis of 2008, producing in one case a 
comprehensive manifesto for a ‘politics of paradise’ as a possible escape 
route from present troubles (Standing 2011).  
 
In the emerging and still tentative dialogue between cultural sociology 
and the various strands of Marxist autonomist thinking presently in play 
concerning precarity, our own research falls firmly within the 
sociological camp. Exploratory in nature, with our particular and, so far 
as we can judge, rare socio-legal emphasis, we have focused on the 
relevance of law for how musicians and dancers make a living, 
particularly the majority of artists who – very commonly – have a 
portfolio of activities that cross-subsidise one another and who produce 
work in quite difficult conditions. How does this relate to the prevailing 
rights regime? 
 
Recent research has drawn attention to a number of common 
characteristic features of the cultural labour market. The sociologist of 
art, Pierre-Michel Menger (1999: 546), notes the ‘contingent 
employment’ that defines artistic labour markets, which is usually 
characteristic of the ‘low-trained and low-educated’. But cultural workers 
are actually highly skilled and pay the price of uncertainty to undertake 
their chosen métier. David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker (2011: chs 5-
6), in their major study of British magazine journalists, TV workers and 
musicians, have underlined the oversupply of willing personnel on the 
market and the prevalence of unpaid or low-paid work in what is often a 
highly exploitative intern culture. They have also focused both on the 
chronic anxieties associated with creative work and the compensations of 
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being in a ‘cool’ and engaging occupation that offers – at least, at times – 
the prospect of ‘pleasurable absorption’. In line with what we have also 
observed, Hesmondhalgh and Baker point to the precariousness of 
creative careers (especially for women) and also the rather unbounded 
nature of the occupational milieu, with its endemic need to network 
intensely to secure the next job and the way that this might make the 
motives for socializing with co-workers sometimes highly ambiguous.  
 
This broad characterisation is certainly not limited to the UK, as a recent 
polemic on ‘les intellos précaires’ in France makes clear. Stimulating and 
sought-after work across a wide range of occupations, from teaching to 
museum work to journalism is coupled with fragile social conditions for 
employees. Employment and precariousness may and do co-exist, 
marking a shift in the debate in France over the past decade from one 
about unemployment in cultural and other work into one concerning 
poorly rewarded ‘intellectual’ workers (Rambach and Rambach 2009). 
 
Market and workplace conditions deeply condition the career strategies of 
cultural workers, which differ in precise detail according to the 
opportunity structures of each cultural practice. For freelancers (and even 
for those who are unionized) seeking to enhance income by making 
claims on employers can often be perilous for securing future work. This, 
of course, is relevant for the highly specific question of negotiating one’s 
legal rights under precarious conditions that, in any case, offer a weak 
bargaining position (Menger 1999; Towse 2006). 
 
The way unequal workplace power affects the exercise of employment 
rights is one entry point into the question of cultural workers’ relationship 
to copyright. However, the focus of our own analysis has been rather 
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different. We have found that in some situations the exercise of legal 
rights might often seem to be irrelevant to cultural workers or, 
alternatively, handled in ways that confound the simplistic expectation 
that income will always be maximised.  
 
In common with Ruth Towse (2006) in her critique of blind spots in 
cultural economics, our own sociological study has led us to question the 
pure economic calculation incentivized by IPR that has become the 
dominant way of thinking about the value of cultural work. Instead, we 
have shifted to the different ground of underlining the trade-offs made 
between making money through commercial activities and making little 
or none through the pursuit of creative and aesthetic goals.  
 
Pertinently, Mark Banks (2007) has recently discussed a range of ways in 
which ‘non-economic moral values’ may be present in cultural work. 
Whether, like Banks, we might ascribe a ‘progressive’ politics to these 
strategies is a contingent and empirical matter. Among the non-monetary 
exchanges Banks identifies is barter. He observes: 
 
‘Indeed, in the cultural industries it is increasingly common to find 
fashion designers, graphic designers, musicians, artists, promoters and 
web entrepreneurs undertaking reciprocal or non-monetized exchange of 
goods and services – particularly amongst more “close-knit” cultural 
clusters.’ (Banks 2007: 172) 
 
As we shall see, this does loosely characterize some of the activity that 
we encountered in our research. So too does another mode of exchange 
noted by Banks (ibid), namely ‘a resurgence of interest in gift-giving and 
gift economies amongst artists and cultural producers’. That said, as he 
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also remarks, such practices ‘remain marginal forms of economizing’ and 
‘artists themselves rely upon conventional “second” jobs in order to 
survive’ (Banks 2007: 179). 
 
Making a living, fulfilling the dream 
We need to understand better how - in a cultural economy of low 
expectations about earning enough to sustain a creative practice - the 
possession of rights actually works. Where this might relate to a 
significant financial return, self-protection makes sense. But where 
formal rights don’t have any obvious relation to economic wellbeing, a 
relatively relaxed attitude to their exercise is entirely rational.  
 
In what follows, we discuss a range of behaviour described to us by our 
informants, illustrating the complex relationship to rights that obtains in 
the cultural field. Throughout all the discussions we held there were 
tensions between what was commonly described on the one hand as 
‘commercial work’ and on the other as ‘creative work’. 
 
Contracts and the extra-contractual 
One of our interviewees, Aurora Fearnley, a London-based film maker 
who worked on dance movies out of interest, described her need over 
time to develop a ‘business mind’ in order to undertake the multi-tasking 
required for a small enterprise.8 As her career had developed, particularly 
in terms of securing regular commercial work, she and her closest 
colleagues had decided to create a partnership in order to remove ‘that 
feeling of an individual getting work commissioned by someone else. It 
kind of evens things out.’ She had wanted to ‘remove power struggles 
within companies where you are giving your work all the time…We have 
legal contracts that state that the work is split evenly this way…We have 
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a business bank account together, so that is very serious stuff…You have 
to be prepared to look at all the different implications of where your work 
goes, who says who is in charge of it, who paid for it, who does it go 
to…’ This was needed to forestall any disputes.  
 
The partnership had been set up alongside a company that handled the 
corporate work undertaken by the partners because there was a strong 
sense that creative work and the business side should be kept separate. 
The likely durability of this model is less interesting than what it tells us 
about the distinction made between two different dimensions of cultural 
work (‘making money’ and ‘being creative’) and how the explicit 
recourse to contractual relations is in tension with an attempt to conserve 
an extra-contractual sense of amicable collaboration. 
 
Richard Caves (2000: 12-14) has applied the theory of contracts to the 
creative industries, where – he notes – ‘complex projects require the 
collaboration of several parties, each providing different but 
complementary inputs or resources’. Of direct pertinence to our argument 
are his remarks on ‘the notion of an implicit contract that involves no 
written terms at all, only an informal understanding the project will be 
governed by practices that are common knowledge in the community’.  
 
Fearnley and her colleagues moved from their implicit contract – which 
was in all likelihood experienced as an extra-contractual situation that is 
not legally binding - to two explicit ones. In practice, it appears that 
implicit and explicit contractual relations may routinely coexist, as other 
examples detailed below make clear. Implicit contracts can operate in a 
non-legal way to create solidarity on a project. 
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Ambiguity about contracts (and the rights that they secure) ran through 
other examples that we encountered. Slanjayvahdanza is a small company 
based in Leeds, in the north of England. Jenni Wren is artistic director 
and also the company’s choreographer and a performer. As the 
choreographer, she is the copyright holder in the operation. At the same 
time, she was highly aware that she was involved in a range of 
collaborative relationships.9 She observed: 
 
‘I think it is very important that people get credited for what it is that they 
do…I am a facilitator and a director, and generally it is my concepts, and 
I bring along artists that are interested in the concepts and interested in 
the concept becoming a reality…But I think that the work doesn’t […] 
belong to me…It belongs to everybody – ownership…You have to give 
everybody a certain amount of ownership for the project […] to be 
successful, otherwise you won’t get the best creativity from it.’ 
 
Wren’s approach coupled her recognition of the varied contributions 
made by her performers and crew to realising the work with an astute 
sense of how giving that recognition actually underpinned achieving the 
best possible performance. It was also grounded in a sense of how her 
role as the primary initiator of the project in question needed to be 
managed: 
 
‘I never say, “solely choreographed by Jenni Wren”… “Concept by Jenni 
Wren, choreographed in collaboration with dancers”. Because I task my 
dancers greatly, I will give them movement that they then have to put on 
their bodies… So, you can’t take ownership. And they can’t take 
ownership because they are working under your direction. So it has to be 
a joint ownership. The only ownership really, and that they know 
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contractually, it is a property, if anything, under the name of the 
company, which doesn't even belong to me. It doesn’t actually belong to 
anyone.’ 
 
Given the choreographer’s formal recognition in law as the author, from a 
copyright point of view the way in which the sharing of credit for the 
work was talked about is particularly interesting. It showed how the 
ownership of the work might be finessed so that everyone buys in to the 
collective effort. In short, a shared ethos is created through a collective 
willingness to misrecognize legal relations. On this occasion, the 
allocation of credits took a democratic form and while it referred to 
contractual terms, in reality it relied on the kind of collaboration that 
derives from extra-contractual relations. Or to put it in Caves’s terms, an 
implicit contract is acted on that would in fact be unenforceable as, if it 
came to a dispute under current law the rights would reside with the 
choreographer.  
 
A third example comes from the practice of the folk-pop band, 6 Day 
Riot. The band’s founder and singer-songwriter, Tamara Schlesinger, 
said: 
  
‘As a band, we make a living or what living we can from live 
performances and as a record company – because I run my own label – 
we make the money back…from CD sales and digital sales as well. I’ve 
got a separate contract with the band members giving them a cut of 
royalties... The copyright remains with me. I don’t have to give them any 
money because they are helping to arrange, but the actual words, chorus, 
melody, everything is really written by me. But this is the only way I can 
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generate income for them. And so, therefore, I want to try and give them 
a cut.’10 
 
While the amounts concerned are very modest, these payments are 
essential to sustaining commitment, more to offer a sense of achievement 
than to offer a serious return on time invested. The flow of money derives 
mainly from income earned by the band for performances at festivals and 
other venues and other performers’ payments generated by radio, 
television or syncs. The contractual rights relating to percentages 
assigned for the contribution to given songs or albums have not to date 
been exercised by band members and the small amounts of income 
generated have been left in the tiny record company that runs the label 
and which is the band’s financial vehicle. Indeed, it all operates on trust – 
an implicit contract - as no contracts have been signed. 
 
Two further examples from our fieldwork are also germane. One comes 
from the avant-garde composer, Michael Alcorn, who at one stage in his 
career had taken a highly conventional view of the composer as protected 
by copyright.11 This was unexpectedly challenged when working closely 
on one of his pieces with a percussionist: 
 
‘We developed this piece together – and that is exactly what happened.  
And at the very end of it, I was left thinking, “Well, who actually owns 
this?” because he played all the samples that I then took away from the 
studio and a lot of the gestures were purely down to his playing. And in 
the end I had a very loose sort of graphic score but it could have been a 
complete flop in someone else’s hands and he knew what to do with it. So 
I was left at the end of this thing, “Is it mine or is it his or is it ours?”’ 
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So far as Alcorn was concerned, the score and the electronic sounds used 
were his, however, for the purpose of awarding credits he had agreed 
with the percussionist that it was ‘my piece developed in collaboration 
with Renzo Spiteri’. The act of collaboration had brought about a 
modification of how the composer’s copyright in the work was conceived 
and how credit should be assigned. Had the piece generated any income, 
‘I think Renzo would be knocking on my door. In fact, I am sure he 
would.’ And in any case, Alcorn thought, the percussionist would be 
claiming publicly that it was a collaborative piece. 
 
A similar example came from the choreographer, Johan Stjernholm.12 On 
receiving a commission to perform a work at an international competition 
he had settled a fee and other terms and conditions to cover the work of a 
collaborating dancer. Stjernholm subsequently felt that the contribution 
had in effect been a work of co-creation that was not recognized 
contractually. No claim was made to that effect and this did not become 
an issue retrospectively because there was no money to be made. But as 
in the instance cited by Michael Alcorn, it is easy to imagine how it could 
have become a source of dispute if the stakes had been higher.  
 
While all of these cases demonstrate a clear awareness by each 
interviewee of the role of contracts and rights, none conforms to a model 
of pure economic or legal calculation. Implicit contractual relations are 
the bedrock of cooperation. The complex and often fraught relations that 
obtain when producing works collaboratively clearly has a great bearing 
on how collegiality is to be sustained by way of often quite informally 
awarding credits and exercising discretion over financial rewards. This 
begins to open up how, when the stakes are low, a very flexible view of 
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copyright and performers’ rights may often be taken. This is a long way 
from the simple ruling idea that IPR incentivizes production. 
 
Portfolio work and collaboration 
Now in his early sixties and reflecting on more than forty years in the 
music industry, Rab Noakes, Chair of the Musicians’ Union when we 
interviewed him in May 2010, recounted a series of different forms of 
work he had undertaken ‘to keep that kind of creative bedrock there’.13  
Aside from singing and recording, he had played in bands, formed 
independent production companies, worked in the music field at BBC 
Radio Scotland, and had also been involved in several television 
productions. On balance, he thought: 
 
‘I am reluctant to say it’s not an easy life because, you know, Heavens, 
it’s not diamond mining in Natal, it’s way above the parapet when it 
comes to hard labour. But at the same time, it’s a kind of a draining 
exercise…If I do have any advice for young people now, I would say that 
while it’s going well for you, there is a tendency to think it’s going to be 
like that forever. But the reality is that it’s not going to be like that for 
very long.’ 
 
Pierre-Michel Menger’s (1999: 560) sociological analysis is in complete 
accord with this view: ‘Uncertainty plays a major role not only during the 
early part of a career but throughout the whole span of the professional 
lifetime.’ The fundamental vagaries of a career in cultural work were 
evident from our other interviewees, all at different life stages. At the 
time of our interview with her in 2010, the choreographer Jenni Wren 
was in her early thirties. She had acquired sufficient skill to access a 
series of seven Arts Council England grants that allowed her to sustain 
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her then six-year-old company’s work. She favoured keeping the 
operation as small and as non-bureaucratic as possible in order to 
maximize creative control. Typical of one with a good decade’s 
experience of portfolio work, however, she said: 
 
‘If there wasn’t that support…I would probably work at the weekend, live 
on very, very little and try and continue doing my work during the week, 
which has often been the case.’  
 
Whatever the relative success of her work, Wren observed, ‘Even when 
you think you’re doing well, it is still hand to mouth.’  
 
Others, not surprisingly, shared this view. The choreographer Johan 
Stjernholm, also in his early thirties, had completed a PhD, then taught 
part-time at the University of the Arts London and was also in the process 
of juggling various options.  
 
‘I have a dance studio where I teach dance and give workshops and raise 
a little money... I do a bit of different productions. Some of them, the 
more mediocre ones, bring in the money as before. Interesting ones make 
much less money. Sometimes I work completely for free because it is, I 
think, a very interesting project. But this is precisely my question. How 
can this be transformed into a more sustainable situation?’14 
 
One solution, he found, was to take a teaching post at the Royal Academy 
of Dance, which gave his portfolio much more stability. 
 
Others too juggled with the stresses and strains of multi-tasking. When 
we interviewed them in late 2009, two members of 6 Day Riot, then 
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respectively in their early and late twenties, told us that they each 
combined various jobs with the need to be flexible enough to take on gigs 
in a busy season.15 Subsequently, as band members’ work commitments 
have become more demanding, finding common free time for rehearsals, 
tours and gigs has become increasingly difficult. Performing Rights 
Society (PRS) payments, CD sales and that of other merchandise such as 
T-shirts, payments for gigs - all were required to finance the touring that 
mostly broke even. Without PRS grant support earlier that year, the band 
could not have performed at the North by North-East music festival in 
Toronto.  
 
Portfolio work may spill over into new collaborations as well as being 
focused on a specific art form. In addition to her choreographic work, 
Wren had collaborated with the filmmaker Aurora Fearnley, also in her 
early thirties, to produce two films that had been screened at international 
festivals. The point, she said, was ‘to reach out to a more diverse 
audience’. The films did not bring in any box office returns but had a 
promotional role. Fearnley, whose income then came from working as a 
free-lance video editor on commercial projects, saw making dance films 
as giving her the chance to express herself. She drew a distinction 
between ‘the really well-paid work which I have to try and constantly go 
and look for’ and ‘all the crazy work, which I am creating and 
producing’. The latter option gave her more freedom: 
 
‘The product that we try and produce on film is something that comes 
from our creative idea of what we want it to look like, without ever really 
taking into account who is going to watch it…It’s about what happens 
while you are capturing it…You never want to think about who is going 
to see it, the audience, the money side of things, because it takes all the 
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fun and enjoyment out of it…I don’t do it for money, that’s the thing. I 
am genuine, like I will do it anyway and I will work my weekends and 
holidays just to make it happen.’ 
 
Once again, this conveys a very clear sense of the value ascribed to 
creative control, the pleasure and excitement of exercising autonomous 
judgment, and the willingness to sacrifice time without any obvious direct 
economic reward. 
 
Another example of collaboration across cultural fields came from the 
east London-based folk-pop band, 6 Day Riot. Having achieved critical 
success but no breakthrough, and keen to exploit social media in order to 
build their fan base, the band embarked on making a series of music 
videos in the hope that these would create new audiences. This required a 
considerable mobilization of a range of skills on the basis of goodwill as 
well as access to the necessary resources, such as an appropriate location, 
animation skills, an actor, high-level camera operation and digital editing. 
From the account given, it is clear that a music video may be made on 
these kinds of terms because people know each other through their social 
and work networks and that there is a coincidence between the band’s 
interest in finding new forms of promotion and those of the ad hoc 
production team. As a piece of non-routine work where the self-
constituted production team has complete creative control, since it is its 
own client, it is fun to do. The equipment and space are at hand for no or 
at marginal cost. While for the musicians releasing a video offers 
potential support to a musical career and a presence on YouTube, for the 
other members of the creative team it is another item on a show reel, 
something to enter into a competition or have discussed in the trade press. 
For everyone, devising a new video on those terms can be an extension of 
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their creative skills. There is no starting assumption that anyone will 
make money and rights issues are easily resolved by allocating credits.   
 
This kind of exchange – as with the unpaid collaboration over dance 
movies – greatly complicates how we might think about models of 
cultural work. This could be interpreted as collaboration now for a hoped-
for deferred benefit – in short, you could argue that economic rationality 
still underlies the willingness to work together on a project for no 
immediate economic return. However, that seems too reductive. 
 
There are non-economic reasons for working together that emerge from 
our examples: for instance, the derivation of pleasure through sociality 
and belief in shared aesthetic values. The styles of collaboration 
discussed are more like a gift relationship – which is a complex form of 
converting value into obligation – than a market relationship. In our 
illustrative cases, where time and effort are committed, reciprocity figures 
large: there is an underlying assumption that ‘you will return my gift in 
due time or when necessary’ (Komter 2005: 48) We certainly do not have 
to exclude self-interest from the mix of motivations that sustains such 
exchanges but friendship and the identification with a project and people 
are likely to be much more important. 
 
The need to collaborate in such ways as well as to combine different 
forms of work is plainly a career-long requirement, unless significant 
financial success occurs for an individual artist.  
 
Michael Alcorn, an avant-garde composer, in his late forties when 
interviewed, and with more than two decades of work behind him, is also 
Professor of Music Composition at Queen’s University Belfast.  He 
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observed that he did not know a single composer who could make a 
living from his music alone: 
 
‘I guess many of them are involved in education in some capacity…and 
others are doing sort of routine jobs…I don’t know of anybody who can 
do it alone, unless of course they are doing commercial music as well.’16 
 
At an earlier stage of his career, in the 1990s, he had had received ‘a run 
of composing commissions’ but this was now well in the past. Moreover, 
as commissioning bodies multiplied the strings attached to making their 
support available, he had progressively lost interest and tried to pursue 
his own projects. He had also reached the point where he wished to make 
his past compositions generally available: 
 
‘I thought, “I am just going to put all my scores and parts up online for 
free”. I would just rather people downloaded them and played them than 
worry about charging or selling my music. […] I think I have given up 
with the commercialization thing…I am not sure I want to put time into 
the process of commercializing. If I have time, I would rather spend it 
creating new work. I think that is maybe because I am fortunate in having 
a job that keeps the body and soul together and recognition that my 
compositional work is valued and takes time in theory for me to do that 
work. But I think if it were otherwise, I might think differently.’ 
 
This gives a very clear sense of how with a secure basis for portfolio 
work, creative choices can be significantly enlarged and how – when the 
prospect of making money is in any case remote – a very relaxed view 
may taken about the exercise of copyright.  
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Another example of this attitude came from Steve Beresford, in his early 
sixties, a free improviser based in London, who had spent forty years in 
the music industry. Beresford said: 
 
‘I have never made a living out of just playing music. Maybe that’s just 
me. But my impression is that certainly playing free improvisation there 
are very few people anywhere in the world who make a complete living 
out of it. Maybe a dozen or something.’17 
 
He had in the past written ‘jingles, opening titles, music for TV shows, 
did a few feature films, stuff like that’.18 However, in his present work, he 
mainly performed, combining that with teaching commercial music at the 
University of Westminster, and remarked that ‘it is really great to have a 
cheque coming in every month, and I certainly couldn’t do that by 
playing music’.  
 
Speaking of events held at his favoured venue in east London, Café Oto, 
where he regularly joined forces with other improvisers, he observed, 
‘We don’t make any money but at least we don’t hate each other because 
nobody makes any money’.  This did not mean complete indifference to 
performers’ rights but it did mean they could be handled in a way that 
presumed trust and collegiality, as little was at stake: 
 
‘Actually, it is pretty simple. As far as we are concerned, it’s an instant 
composition. It’s a composition and we put a PRS form in and it is 
written by whoever played it. The only problem is if there are 40 people 
playing it, you have got to get all those names on the sheet.’ 
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In that event, as the money involved would be ‘extremely marginal’, one 
person would sign the form ‘and if you make any money out of it, you 
share the money out when it comes in a cheque’. This very liberal 
dispensation was also extended to members of the audience making a 
recording of performances. So far as Beresford was concerned, this was 
not a rights-threatening exploitation of the work but rather ‘one of the 
positive aspects of playing non-commercial music’.  
 
For his part, however, Michael Alcorn, while recognizing that ‘the whole 
history of music is built on sampling other people’s music’ was also clear 
that for him some non-authorised recordings went beyond the acceptable 
and he had a clear sense of where the lines should be drawn: 
 
‘I wouldn’t worry so much, say, if somebody took part of an orchestral or 
chamber music piece of mine and decided to sample it because that really 
isn’t the work. For me, the work is something else. It’s the piece itself. 
But if I’d been in the studio working on a sort of electronic piece where 
you come up with a sound that really has its own special identity, that is 
the creative thing, I would be pretty upset about that because…creating 
those sounds is extremely hard work.’ 
 
That both Alcorn and Beresford could take a broadly liberal view of 
copyright was undoubtedly connected to their present secure conditions 
of work and their low expectations of what their output could achieve by 
way of monetary returns. Both were pre-eminently concerned with 
protecting moral rights, namely ‘rights of attribution, integrity, disclosure 
and withdrawal’ that are highly relevant for an artist’s reputation (Towse 
2006: 571). Alcorn’s specific concern about infringement was an 
emphatic insistence on this kind of recognition, more concerned with the 
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potential injury to him as creator of the work than with any economic 
returns.  
  
Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests that much cultural work in the fields of music and 
dance resists institutionalization, making policy intervention very 
challenging.  Both the law and cultural policy tend to focus on the 
product of cultural work and how it can be protected and exploited. What 
receives much less attention is how creative milieux actually operate and 
the value systems of those who work in them.  
 
Congruent with Towse’s argument in the field of cultural economics, our 
own analysis suggests that the rights conferred by copyright legislation 
seem not to give an incentive to produce or perform. The fact of their 
existence was not the driver for creation: that was the personal 
commitment to an art form and a desire for self-realisation. Of course, for 
this to take place, musicians and dancers have to find ways of making a 
living, to which end they assemble a portfolio, in itself a challenge for 
sustainability over a lifetime’s career.  
 
How our interviewees account for what motivates them to undertake 
cultural work accords with the ‘romantic’ conception of creativity (Negus 
and Pickering 2004: ch.7). This does not fit easily into the current legal 
and economic discourses of IPR and cultural policy. However, the point 
of our analysis is that creative cultures be taken seriously – and not just 
be regarded as irrational obstacles to economic growth. Typically, 
cultural workers routinely trade off artistic considerations against their 
need to make a living.  It is this that sustains the hinterland of cultural 
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production in general and provides the platform for the few successes that 
can indeed emerge to fully exploit IPR.  
 
Our findings, therefore, do not suggest that copyright is simply irrelevant 
to most cultural workers’ ways of making a living. That is certainly not 
the case. Rather, we have sought to elucidate some of the strategies for 
handling rights in creative cultures. Holding rights seldom equates to 
making any significant amount of money. Taking that perspective leads 
us directly into reappraising collaborative social relations and well-
understood etiquettes that tend to escape the attentions of a politics of 
intervention for the greater glory of the creative nation.  
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Notes 
1 The investigators were supported by the advice of a network of researchers: Michael 
Alcorn, Professor of Musical Composition, Queen’s University Belfast; Gillian 
Doyle, Senior Lecturer in Media and Cultural Policy, University of Glasgow; Fiona 
Macmillan, Professor of Intellectual Property, Birkbeck College, University of 
London; and Helen Thomas, Professor of Historical and Cultural Studies, University 
of the Arts London.  
2 Our study is intended to be exploratory rather than comprehensive. We have drawn 
on a dancers focus group comprising six participants; two joint interviews concerning 
music, each with two participants; one joint interview on music and dance (with one 
earlier music interviewee re-interviewed but on new issues); four individual 
interviews, three on music, one on dance; and three re-interviews, two on music and 
one on dance.  
3 This will be published on the www.beyondtext.ac.uk website and archived at the 
British Library in due course. 
4 For some pertinent critiques see Bustamante ed. 2010, Garnham 2005, O’Connor 
2010. 
5 For useful surveys of the conceptual precursors of ideas about the creative economy, 
see Banks 2007, Hesmondhalgh 2007, and O’Connor 2010.  
6  For analyses of New Labour discourse and of the policy thinktankerati, see 
Schlesinger 2007 and 2009. For an overview of the literature, see O’Connor 2010. 
7 Howkins considers 15 ‘core creative industries’, as compared to the DCMS’s 13. 
8 Aurora Fearnley, speaking in the dancers focus group, London, 9 March 2010. 
9 Jenni Wren, speaking in the dancers focus group, London, 9 March 2010. 
10 Interview with Tamara Schlesinger, Glasgow, 2 September 2010. 
11 Michael Alcorn, joint interview with Michael Alcorn and Steve Beresford, London, 
12 March 2010. 
12 Interview with Johan Stjernholm, London, 13 January 2011. 
13 Interview with Rab Noakes, Glasgow, 10 May 2010. 
14 Johan Stjernhom, speaking in the dancers focus group, London 9 March 2010. 
15  Interview with Daniel Deavin and Tamara Schlesinger, both of 6 Day Riot, 
Edinburgh, 12 November 2009. 
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16Michael Alcorn, joint interview with Michael Alcorn and Steve Beresford, London, 
12 March 2010. 
17 Interview with Steve Beresford, London, 13 January 2011. 
18 Steve Beresford, joint interview with Michael Alcorn and Steve Beresford, London, 
12 March 2010. 
